It makes sense to study what ‘free will’ means in daily conversations, law, and practical philosophy—even if it is a shaky concept. Thus, to complete my bi-perspectival model of free will, I propose a compatibilist account of relative free will that attempts: (1) to provide a synthesis of a variety of well-known models, capable of addressing problems of the latter; (2) to account for the fact that free will comes in degrees; (3) to interface with neurobiology. I argue that (relative) free will comes in degrees, as suggested by neurobiology. A concept that can precisely ‘measure’ the variability of free will is—once more—that of ‘theory*’, or rather, the capacity to make assumptions/hypotheses and apply them. This model highlights that free-willed actions are consciously monitored by the agent, through beliefs, assumptions, generally theories*—hence the CMT model (for Conscious-through-Monitoring-through-Theories*). I end by adjoining the absolute view to the relative one, and sketch some implications of this bi-perspectival account.