This short chapter is meant as an immediate application of the key postulates of synthetic philosophy, exposed in Chapter 1 . I argue that the problem of induction can be unmasked as a pseudo-problem by using Aristotle’s insights on the working of science and his notion of ‘first principle’. These insights are corroborated by centuries of scientific practice. Therefore, if philosophy wishes to employ epistemic standards comparable to those at work in science, it should adopt a well-defined principle of induction as a first principle, in other words as an unprovable basic axiom, and recognise that asking for its logical justification makes little sense. This result can be seen as an application of the MCT-thesis, implying that problems are solved by theories; some of these theories’ assumptions cannot be derived from higher-order theories; and must therefore remain unjustified in this sense. But in another sense they can be maximally justified, especially the principle of induction.