The next three chapters turn to the empirical study of player-governance in practice. Challenges abound when setting up a company with others. Creating an orchestra company calls for responses to specialised questions. Founders bring their own interests, goals, and expertise. What steps do musicians take when they start a democratically run orchestra? How do these choices set up sustainable structures? This chapter highlights three areas: taking artistic control, improving job security, and creating the best governance structure. Musicians want control but they recognise that commercial factors call for attention. Making music with esteemed colleagues proved a strong driver for musicians and helps sustain democratic control. Taking home a share of profits benefits workers in many labour-managed firms. Orchestras, however, typically run as not-for-profits. For freelance musicians, the desire for greater job security acts as an alternative economic impetus when profit-sharing is unavailable. Who gets to vote in and be elected in a player-run orchestra? Should musicians and managers have the same rights? What happens if, over time, new players get taken on as “hired hands” rather than as members? How can player-governed orchestras be set up to resist any watering down of their democratic ideals? Such questions are central to this chapter as it maps the foundational decisions when musicians control orchestras.

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Going for Democracy: Setup Decisions

  • Brian Long

摘要

The next three chapters turn to the empirical study of player-governance in practice. Challenges abound when setting up a company with others. Creating an orchestra company calls for responses to specialised questions. Founders bring their own interests, goals, and expertise. What steps do musicians take when they start a democratically run orchestra? How do these choices set up sustainable structures? This chapter highlights three areas: taking artistic control, improving job security, and creating the best governance structure. Musicians want control but they recognise that commercial factors call for attention. Making music with esteemed colleagues proved a strong driver for musicians and helps sustain democratic control. Taking home a share of profits benefits workers in many labour-managed firms. Orchestras, however, typically run as not-for-profits. For freelance musicians, the desire for greater job security acts as an alternative economic impetus when profit-sharing is unavailable. Who gets to vote in and be elected in a player-run orchestra? Should musicians and managers have the same rights? What happens if, over time, new players get taken on as “hired hands” rather than as members? How can player-governed orchestras be set up to resist any watering down of their democratic ideals? Such questions are central to this chapter as it maps the foundational decisions when musicians control orchestras.