This chapter first examines Habermas’s attempt to translate Kant’s categorical imperative into discourse-theoretical terms. While this reformulation commendably shifts attention from solitary reasoning to dialogical justification, it severs Kant’s crucial link between reason and desire. Habermas’s model of judgment therefore cannot explain how subjectivity may be decentered and transformed in encounters with sensible beings. In search of an alternative, the chapter turns to Kant himself, showing how his writings blur the line between monological moral and dialogical aesthetic judgment. By tracing his account of respect and his acknowledgment that aesthetic judgment can awaken moral concern for nature, the chapter brings to light a neglected thread in his thought. What emerges is a Kantian conception of reflective judgment that is at once moral and aesthetic, receptive to the expressive agency of nature, and open to transformative encounters with human and nonhuman others. This reframing unsettles the dualism between the dignity of persons and the price of things, rendering the boundaries of the moral community contestable, and extending the horizon of recognition.