The purpose of this chapter is to question the status of a work of art on the basis of the problem of interpretation initially posed by Arthur Danto. Does a work of art necessarily require interpretation? The argumentation unfolds on a double scale. On an ontological scale, the issue at stake is to know under what conditions an object belongs to the class of works of art. On a denotative scale, the issue is to know if all artistic representation requires interpretation. The author defends a theory of restricted interpretation, inspired by pragmatism, according to which interpretation, as a suspensive and reflexive activity, intervenes only when the relationship to meaning is disturbed, confused, problematic. Thus, a work of art is subject to interpretation only when its ontological status is not self-evident and when its potential for denotation is at odds with our familiar relationship to meaning. A work of art’s vocation to be interpreted does not imply that this is always the case. It all depends, pragmatically speaking, on how receivers appropriate it.