The Epistemic Significance of Noetic Feelings: On the Origins of Self-Knowledge
摘要
This chapter integrates the preceding claims into a theory of how normative self-knowledge emerges. It advances a hierarchical account of confidence: at the base, embodied feelings regulate immediate cognitive control; at intermediate levels, these feelings are interpreted and calibrated within shared practices; at the top, they become holistic experiences of one’s epistemic stance as appropriate or not, which is itself subject to challenge. On this view, reasons are not just private mental items but socially validated demonstrations that one’s stance satisfies low-level (fluency/accuracy), mid-level (epistemic trustworthiness, transparency), and high-level (truth, justification) norms. The chapter shows the transitions from confidence to justification are gradual, practice-laden, and corrigible. Thus, noetic feelings are epistemically significant because, when appropriately scaffolded, they give rise to and constrain the emergence of reason-giving.