This chapter critiques non-embodied, non-embedded approaches to metacognition. It examines two dominant approaches, one inspired by Shea’s subpersonal account of metarepresentation and Proust’s cognitive role account, showing how both fall short in explaining how noetic feelings could support epistemic agency rather than merely guiding adaptive behavior. These failures point to the need for a more embodied and embedded framework, one that situates metacognition within the broader social ecology. Neither strategy shows how such signals become epistemically significant, how they license appraisal in terms of truth, reasons, and accountability. The chapter concludes that attempts to solve both prongs of triviality without appeal to embodiment and embedding are systematically unstable. It motivates the pivot to a strong embodied account, rooted in affective and interoceptive processes, and to an embedded account, rooted in social practices that interpret, correct, and normatively regiment embodied expressions of those feelings.