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We investigate the risk of embedding stealthy hardware Trojans in implementations of multivariate quadratic (MQ) based post-quantum signature schemes that use the Keccak-based hashing module. Our study reveals that MAYO and UOV are more vulnerable due to the predictable interaction of message and secret seed within the Keccak module, while SNOVA and QR-UOV exhibit inherent resilience by deviating from this structure. We demonstrate how minimal hardware Trojans, occupying merely 0.03% of the circuit area, can be inserted into MAYO implementations to leak critical internal secrets such as the seed, potentially enabling key recovery under suitable conditions. Our results underscore the need for thorough hardware security evaluation of PQC implementations before they are deployed.

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Stealthy Hardware Trojan Attacks on MQ-Based Post-quantum Digital Signatures

  • 会议论文

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Aikata Aikata,
  • Anisha Mukherjee,
  • Sujoy Sinha Roy

摘要

We investigate the risk of embedding stealthy hardware Trojans in implementations of multivariate quadratic (MQ) based post-quantum signature schemes that use the Keccak-based hashing module. Our study reveals that MAYO and UOV are more vulnerable due to the predictable interaction of message and secret seed within the Keccak module, while SNOVA and QR-UOV exhibit inherent resilience by deviating from this structure. We demonstrate how minimal hardware Trojans, occupying merely 0.03% of the circuit area, can be inserted into MAYO implementations to leak critical internal secrets such as the seed, potentially enabling key recovery under suitable conditions. Our results underscore the need for thorough hardware security evaluation of PQC implementations before they are deployed.