Green Deals have been introduced across Western economies as large-scale, mission-oriented innovation policies (MOIPs) intended to combine economic growth with environmental sustainability. Rooted in the concept of an “entrepreneurial state,” these initiatives reflect renewed confidence in governments’ ability to direct technological and industrial transformation. However, their outcomes have frequently diverged from expectations. This volume examines the theoretical foundations and empirical results of Green Deals, highlighting the institutional, economic, and behavioral factors that contribute to their shortcomings. Drawing on perspectives from evolutionary economics, public choice theory, and behavioral political economy, the contributors analyze a wide range of cases, including Germany’s Energiewende, Italy’s Superbonus, and the European Union’s hydrogen and battery programs. Across these examples, recurring challenges such as rent-seeking, mission capture, optimism bias, and distorted incentives are identified. The findings indicate that while Green Deals have advanced ambitious sustainability goals, they often undermine competitiveness and fiscal stability while generating limited environmental benefits. The volume concludes by outlining alternative pathways that emphasize incremental, technology-neutral, and institutionally grounded approaches to sustainability—approaches that align more closely with long-term economic resilience and effective environmental policy.