This chapter critically examines the “trust in science” model, a prevalent proposal for integrating scientific knowledge into democratic decision-making. The chapter first establishes a robust philosophical account of trust, distinguishing between mere epistemic reliance and the richer, moral-evaluative concept of trust that involves interpersonal dynamics and vulnerability. It argues that meaningful trust in science cannot be reduced to simple reliance on scientific institutions but must involve this moral dimension, particularly concerning scientists’ handling of value judgments and inductive risk. Having established this definition, the chapter’s central argument is that the trust model, while valuable, is an insufficient and fragile foundation for democratic decision-making. It presents three core shortcomings: first, the epistemic burden placed on citizens to assess trustworthiness is often impractically high; second, trust-based reasons are not suitable for public deliberation as they are not universally compelling; and third, trust is highly dependent on social and institutional preconditions that are easily eroded by political polarization and misinformation. The chapter concludes that while trust is a desirable component, its inherent vulnerabilities demand a search for more robust mechanisms for democratic decision-making.