This chapter establishes the normative framework for the book by grounding the problem of science in democracy in a deeper analysis of the authority of reason. It argues that dominant approaches to scientific expertise overlook this fundamental issue, leading to an oversimplified conception of deference. The chapter begins by critiquing the individualistic and rationalist account of reason implicit in contemporary social epistemology, using Elizabeth Fricker’s work on epistemic autonomy as a key example. Against this, it proposes an alternative Kantian constructivist account, drawing on Onora O’Neill’s interpretation, which defines the authority of reason not as a pre-existing set of rules but as a collective achievement constituted by the public and autonomous use of reason. This re-establishes the non-negotiable value of autonomy. The chapter then re-evaluates modern science as an instance of this public reason, arguing that its objectivity is a product of communal critique. It concludes by introducing the profound challenge that cognitive division of labor and hyper-specialization pose to this Kantian ideal, thereby setting the stage for the book’s subsequent analysis of trust, authority, and democratic models.