Active labor-market policies accompany most social security regimes in wealthy countries. Individuals claiming social welfare or unemployment benefits are compelled to actively apply for jobs, to accept a job if successful, or to participate in training and work programs. The consequences of not complying with these requirements are either a reduction in benefits or in duration. From a perspective of liberal political theory, the question arises as to how such coercion can be justified, since persons in need are thereby additionally constrained in their freedoms. This chapter examines previous attempts to justify the imposition of conditionalities—the Luck Egalitarian argument and the reference to a Principle of Reciprocity—and shows that they both fail. I suggest that the idea of Contributive Justice can be made fruitful for a normative analysis of the issue. The account extends a Principle of Reciprocity to include the aspect of meaningful work. It calls for equal opportunities for the members of society to develop themselves and their skills through work and to gain social recognition. From the account of Contributive Justice we can derive conditions for the justified imposition of work-activating measures and conditionalities for social insurance benefits.

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Conditional Welfare, Active Labor-Market Policy, and Contributive Justice

  • Elias Moser

摘要

Active labor-market policies accompany most social security regimes in wealthy countries. Individuals claiming social welfare or unemployment benefits are compelled to actively apply for jobs, to accept a job if successful, or to participate in training and work programs. The consequences of not complying with these requirements are either a reduction in benefits or in duration. From a perspective of liberal political theory, the question arises as to how such coercion can be justified, since persons in need are thereby additionally constrained in their freedoms. This chapter examines previous attempts to justify the imposition of conditionalities—the Luck Egalitarian argument and the reference to a Principle of Reciprocity—and shows that they both fail. I suggest that the idea of Contributive Justice can be made fruitful for a normative analysis of the issue. The account extends a Principle of Reciprocity to include the aspect of meaningful work. It calls for equal opportunities for the members of society to develop themselves and their skills through work and to gain social recognition. From the account of Contributive Justice we can derive conditions for the justified imposition of work-activating measures and conditionalities for social insurance benefits.