Most philosophical analyses assume that for an entity to be morally responsible for an action/outcome, it is necessary that the entity be a moral agent. Call this the ‘Agency Condition’ on moral responsibility. This article provides some methodological considerations that put pressure on the Agency Condition. ‘Agency’ is a rich notion. Some conditions that a thing must satisfy to count as having agency are unrelated to moral responsibility, particularly the ability to form and execute complex plans. Thus, the Agency Condition puts a stricter requirement on moral responsibility than is warranted. One way to get around this problem is to treat ‘moral agent’ as a technical notion, and stipulate the definition of ‘moral agent’ such that moral agents need not be agents. But given that moral responsibility can have distinct kinds, one will need to provide several stipulative definitions of ‘moral agent’, each corresponding to a different kind of moral responsibility. This stipulative move is not methodologically superior to simply abandoning the Agency condition, whose appeal partly lay in its apparent ability to provide a uniform rationale and explanation for why artificial entities cannot be morally responsible.