Technē Versus Technology: A Virtue Ethics Perspective on Technological Threats to the Ethically Good Self
摘要
Many recent papers have focused on the ethics of particular technological developments—e.g., the ethics of sexbots, ChatGPT, robots—, relatively less attention has been paid to the general nature of technology: What exactly do we mean by technology? Is technology truly, as some maintain, ethically neutral? It is my contention that addressing these sorts of questions requires that we understand that, in modern times, technology has been wrongly and unthinkingly conflated with the much older notion of technē, which ancient thinkers like Aristotle understood to be an intellectual virtue. Section 17.1.1 carefully distinguishes the two concepts and offers an array of reasons for thinking that modern technology poses a far greater ethical threat than technē does. Precisely because technology is not connected with the good in the manner that technē historically has been, the former potentially undermines the flourishing life of a virtuous individual in a way that technē (which the ancients construed as an intellectual virtue) does not. Section 17.1.2 concludes these reflections on with a brief discussion of various issues highlighted by the distinction between technē and technology, issues needing for further research if we are to address the possible threats technology poses to our ethical selves.