Applied ethicists’ interest in narratives and narratives ethics has grown steadily. Some thinkers position narratives as supplements to ethics, while others see narratives as a new form of ethics comparable to virtue or deontological ethics. In this paper, I analyze some of the main ethical claims being made on behalf of business and literary narratives from the perspective of Aristotelian virtue ethics. I argue that, while narratives can significantly contribute to the development of our character, to a better grasp of virtues and vices, and to a clarification of a virtue ethics framework, this contribution is highly nuanced. In particular, Aristotelian virtue ethics enable us to sensibly and helpfully distinguish the ethical value of narratives within business ethics from narrative business ethics per se. Section 12.1.1 offers a provisional definition of narrative and sketches the large claims that have been made for narratives’ relevance to and value for ethics. Section 12.1.2 takes up each of these claims in turn and examine whether the claim makes sense and is true from an Aristotelian virtue ethics. Section 12.1.3 specifies the modest, but nonetheless significant, legitimate roles narratives might play within Aristotle’s virtue ethics. I also point to some limitations inherent in an Aristotelian critique.