In the light of the foregoing analyses, this chapter picks up the moral-philosophical thread of Chapter 4 and examines conscience as a pained realisation of having failed to live up to the claim to respond lovingly—a realisation which, importantly, is itself a belated expression of love. Expounding feelings of guilt and shame as spurious forms of conscience thus understood, it presents remorse as a more promising candidate. After exploring the nuanced relation between remorse, responsibility, and reason-giving, the chapter concludes with a reflection on what it means to engage with the bad conscience of the other person.

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Love and Morality

  • Philip Strammer

摘要

In the light of the foregoing analyses, this chapter picks up the moral-philosophical thread of Chapter 4 and examines conscience as a pained realisation of having failed to live up to the claim to respond lovingly—a realisation which, importantly, is itself a belated expression of love. Expounding feelings of guilt and shame as spurious forms of conscience thus understood, it presents remorse as a more promising candidate. After exploring the nuanced relation between remorse, responsibility, and reason-giving, the chapter concludes with a reflection on what it means to engage with the bad conscience of the other person.