Building on the last chapter’s insights into Martin Buber’s dialogical thought, this chapter continues to develop an ethics of the second person. It begins with a phenomenology of the encounter with the You, exploring its temporal and spatial dimensions in order to expound its intrinsic ethical dimension. Subsequently, it examines what it means for such an encounter to occur under concrete socio-historical circumstances, arguing that the I-You relation resists explanation in supra-relational terms. Shifting to the ethical core motif of I-You, i.e. the open responsiveness to the other’s address, it is finally shown that the decidedly moral dimension of the encounter announces itself in conscience, in particular the bad conscience for not having been fully responsive to the other.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Buber’s I-You as the Basis for a Reconception of Ethics

  • Philip Strammer

摘要

Building on the last chapter’s insights into Martin Buber’s dialogical thought, this chapter continues to develop an ethics of the second person. It begins with a phenomenology of the encounter with the You, exploring its temporal and spatial dimensions in order to expound its intrinsic ethical dimension. Subsequently, it examines what it means for such an encounter to occur under concrete socio-historical circumstances, arguing that the I-You relation resists explanation in supra-relational terms. Shifting to the ethical core motif of I-You, i.e. the open responsiveness to the other’s address, it is finally shown that the decidedly moral dimension of the encounter announces itself in conscience, in particular the bad conscience for not having been fully responsive to the other.