This chapter compares the divergent outcomes of autocratization in Hungary and North Macedonia, applying the book’s framework to explain variation in regime durability. In Hungary, the Fidesz government’s consolidation of legislative, administrative, judicial, and discursive control since 2010 produced a structurally insulated competitive authoritarian regime. Legal entrenchment, combined with the embedding of competing informal institutions, has made alternation of power increasingly difficult. In North Macedonia, the collapse of the VMRO-DPMNE–DUI regime in 2017 created an opening for political change but not systemic democratic transformation. The chapter introduces the concept of segmental regime entrenchment to capture how consociational power-sharing allowed key actors to retain influence through entrenched patronage networks, politicized oversight bodies, and clientelist linkages, even after a change in governing coalition. This produced a hybrid outcome in which competitive authoritarian practices weakened but were not dismantled, and elite continuity persisted alongside formal democratic procedures. The chapter also extends the analysis to Serbia, Poland, the United States, India, and Turkey, emphasizing the role of identity-based discursive legitimation in sustaining or accelerating autocratization. Across these cases, nationalist, religious, or ethnocultural appeals mobilized support, framed opposition as a national threat, and justified entrenchment of power, though their interaction with institutions produced varied democratic resilience or erosion.