This opening chapter lays the conceptual groundwork for the book. It introduces the central research question: Under what conditions, if any, should artificial humanoids be entitled to moral and socio-political status and rights? The chapter presents the key normative presuppositions of the inquiry, namely, the Technological Development Hypothesis (that technological progress will not halt), the Functionalism–Computationalism Hypothesis (that cognition is substrate-independent), From AGI to Superintelligence, On the Odds of a Robot Revolution, and the Species-Independent Criterion for Moral Status Recognition. It critiques anthropocentric assumptions and emphasises the need for a framework grounded in morally relevant properties and social relations. A hybrid* approach is introduced, combining properties-based (cognitive capacities) and relational (social interaction) foundations for moral status.

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General Introduction

  • John-Stewart Gordon

摘要

This opening chapter lays the conceptual groundwork for the book. It introduces the central research question: Under what conditions, if any, should artificial humanoids be entitled to moral and socio-political status and rights? The chapter presents the key normative presuppositions of the inquiry, namely, the Technological Development Hypothesis (that technological progress will not halt), the Functionalism–Computationalism Hypothesis (that cognition is substrate-independent), From AGI to Superintelligence, On the Odds of a Robot Revolution, and the Species-Independent Criterion for Moral Status Recognition. It critiques anthropocentric assumptions and emphasises the need for a framework grounded in morally relevant properties and social relations. A hybrid* approach is introduced, combining properties-based (cognitive capacities) and relational (social interaction) foundations for moral status.