This chapter examines three informal non-state violent actors in Uganda—the Kiboko Squad, the Crime Preventers, and the Kalangala Action Plan—to explain why authoritarian regimes tolerate, encourage, and, in some cases, covertly organize third-party violence against political opponents, even when formal state coercive institutions are present and effective. In 2017, many Ugandans were alarmed by the sudden appearance of a ragtag vigilante group during civilian protests in the capital, Kampala. Armed with sticks and clubs, the group assaulted demonstrators, injuring several, while uniformed police and army personnel stood by without intervening. Subsequent revelations identified the attackers as members of the Kiboko Squad, a vigilante group formed and deployed under the direction of then–Inspector General of Police, General Kale Kayihura. Likewise, during the 2016 elections, the NRM regime sponsored and mobilized another vigilante group, the Crime Preventers, to disrupt opposition mobilization before and after the presidential and parliamentary contests. The chapter explains the relationship between the Museveni regime and non-state violent actors, focusing on how these vigilante groups have been instrumental in consolidating and extending the power of the NRM regime, and the broader implications for the state’s monopoly on legitimate force.

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Outsourcing Repression: Vigilantes and Third-Party Violence Under the NRM

  • Gerald Bareebe

摘要

This chapter examines three informal non-state violent actors in Uganda—the Kiboko Squad, the Crime Preventers, and the Kalangala Action Plan—to explain why authoritarian regimes tolerate, encourage, and, in some cases, covertly organize third-party violence against political opponents, even when formal state coercive institutions are present and effective. In 2017, many Ugandans were alarmed by the sudden appearance of a ragtag vigilante group during civilian protests in the capital, Kampala. Armed with sticks and clubs, the group assaulted demonstrators, injuring several, while uniformed police and army personnel stood by without intervening. Subsequent revelations identified the attackers as members of the Kiboko Squad, a vigilante group formed and deployed under the direction of then–Inspector General of Police, General Kale Kayihura. Likewise, during the 2016 elections, the NRM regime sponsored and mobilized another vigilante group, the Crime Preventers, to disrupt opposition mobilization before and after the presidential and parliamentary contests. The chapter explains the relationship between the Museveni regime and non-state violent actors, focusing on how these vigilante groups have been instrumental in consolidating and extending the power of the NRM regime, and the broader implications for the state’s monopoly on legitimate force.