After consolidating control over the army and intelligence agencies and aligning them with NRM interests, President Museveni pursued a core objective of deploying the security apparatus to suppress anti-regime mobilization, contain entrenched social groups, and neutralize dissent both outside the regime and within its own ranks. Crucially, the regime did not seek the wholesale elimination of opposition forces or the complete dismantling of residual social structures. Instead, it adopted a strategy of containment, i.e., systematically eroding their capacity for collective action, fragmenting their organizational cohesion, and confining their political activity to localized, disjointed arenas that posed minimal threat to regime stability. This chapter explains how the NRM has curtailed the political opposition and socially entrenched groups in Uganda. It argues that, rather than seeking to eliminate dissent or dismantle residual social structures, the regime has pursued a deliberate strategy of containment. Central to this approach is the calibrated use of the army and intelligence agencies, which serve both to suppress threats and co-opt key actors. By selectively neutralizing opposition and managing influential social groups, the NRM ensures that these actors remain politically visible but structurally powerless, preventing coordinated challenges to regime authority. The chapter demonstrates that authoritarian resilience in Uganda relies not solely on coercion, but on the strategic management of pluralism, allowing the regime to preserve the appearance of democratic inclusion while maintaining tight control over political processes.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Visible but Powerless: Politics, Opposition, and Social Group Containment Under the NRM

  • Gerald Bareebe

摘要

After consolidating control over the army and intelligence agencies and aligning them with NRM interests, President Museveni pursued a core objective of deploying the security apparatus to suppress anti-regime mobilization, contain entrenched social groups, and neutralize dissent both outside the regime and within its own ranks. Crucially, the regime did not seek the wholesale elimination of opposition forces or the complete dismantling of residual social structures. Instead, it adopted a strategy of containment, i.e., systematically eroding their capacity for collective action, fragmenting their organizational cohesion, and confining their political activity to localized, disjointed arenas that posed minimal threat to regime stability. This chapter explains how the NRM has curtailed the political opposition and socially entrenched groups in Uganda. It argues that, rather than seeking to eliminate dissent or dismantle residual social structures, the regime has pursued a deliberate strategy of containment. Central to this approach is the calibrated use of the army and intelligence agencies, which serve both to suppress threats and co-opt key actors. By selectively neutralizing opposition and managing influential social groups, the NRM ensures that these actors remain politically visible but structurally powerless, preventing coordinated challenges to regime authority. The chapter demonstrates that authoritarian resilience in Uganda relies not solely on coercion, but on the strategic management of pluralism, allowing the regime to preserve the appearance of democratic inclusion while maintaining tight control over political processes.