A collective approach to science must define and describe the collective agent of science, namely the scientific community. In SSR, the concepts of scientific community and paradigm are co-defined: a paradigm defines the scientific community that holds it. This circularity may pose some problems. However, Kuhn maintained that it is possible to isolate a scientific community without prior recourse to its paradigm. If that is the case, then the philosopher describing a scientific community can ‘discover’ its paradigm. The concept of paradigm faced several criticisms, and, for this reason, in some post-SSR works Kuhn attempted to refine it. This chapter analyses how Kuhn went from a ‘wide’ to a ‘narrow’ conception of paradigm, by introducing the distinction between exemplars and disciplinary matrix. While exemplars have been recently rehabilitated by some philosophers, it is questionable whether they can be isolated from disciplinary matrices, the concept of which deserves deeper analysis.