Kuhn was unable to fully develop a comprehensive theory of truth and scientific progress, which continue to be unresolved topics in his philosophy. This chapter discusses the reasons these issues were significant for Kuhn’s work and expands on his observations concerning both of them. Although he did not support traditional theories of truth, Kuhn also chose not to eliminate the idea entirely. Some of his later writings provide arguments for interpreting him as aligned with coherentism; however, it remains uncertain how he might have formulated his own theory of truth. In addressing the concept of progress, I challenge two prevalent assumptions: first, that Kuhn espoused a purely instrumentalist view of progress; and second, that he believed postulating a general aim for science is unnecessary. Drawing on my interpretation of Kuhn’s dynamic perspective, I describe his conception of scientific progress as an epistemic theory. Furthermore, I elucidate how this framework posits a constitutive, albeit not ultimate, aim for science.