This paper offers a perspective of the histories of EU and U.S. competition law and policy different from common perspectives published in the literature and aired at International Competition Network’s (‘ICN’) conclaves and other meetings among competition agencies. For example, the commonly accepted history of U.S. antitrust enforcement emphasizes “antitrust schools” like the triumphant Chicago School and its emphasis on consumer welfare and price effects. Indeed, U.S. antitrust history often is viewed as a Hegelian progression from a potpourri of political, social and economic goals to the narrower economics concept of consumer welfare adopted in the late 1970s, a telos that continues to dominate U.S. antitrust analysis—although it has been increasingly challenged in the last several years with more aggressive antitrust enforcement directed at mergers and dominant positions of large tech or digital platform firms. The U.S. academic emphasis on antitrust schools is not shared by EU commentators to the same extent, although ordoliberals might differ.