This chapter argues that Pakistan’s ongoing struggle with extremism is the outcome of deliberate strategic choices rather than an accidental by-product of regional instability. From the Afghan jihad to the post-9/11 militant surge, the state’s use of jihadist proxies to secure regional influence, particularly in Kashmir and Afghanistan deeply compromised its internal security. Initially deployed as instruments of strategic depth, these non-state actors gradually evolved into autonomous and ideologically motivated forces that began to challenge the very state that once enabled them. The chapter examines how jihadist ideology, once considered tactically convenient, degenerated into an uncontrollable radical force. This trajectory culminated in the rise of suicide attacks from 2007 onwards, which inflicted widespread harm on Pakistani civilians, institutions, and the armed forces. These attacks were not isolated events but the predictable outcomes of decades of militant patronage, ideological manipulation, and sustained policy denial. The analysis further contends that Pakistan’s counterterrorism approaches, oscillating between appeasement, selective engagement, and reactive militarization have failed to address the structural and ideological roots of extremism. Rather than dismantling militancy, this inconsistency entrenched radical networks, weakened state legitimacy, and empowered the very ideological forces it had previously cultivated.