This chapter explores F. A. Hayek’s significant contributions to the philosophy of social sciences and legal theory, particularly his epistemological and anthropological assumptions. It details key Hayekian notions such as dispersed knowledge, the importance of specific circumstances of time and place, the limited transmissibility of practical knowledge and the bounded human capacity for knowledge. The chapter then compares Hayek’s legal theory with classic schools of thought. It distinguishes Hayek’s view from iusnaturalism by noting his lack of a substantive moral purpose for law and his emphasis on endogenous, spontaneously evolving orders. Against legal positivism, Hayek posits that law precedes legislation, incorporates heterogeneous elements (nomos and thesis) and is understood through limited human reason within a dynamic, non-fixed system. While sharing an empirical perspective with legal realism, Hayek differs on the judge’s less creative role and adopts Karl Popper’s view of knowledge as trial and error, not empirically verifiable truth. Finally, the chapter outlines the enduring relevance of Hayek’s ideas to current theories, including bounded rationality, complex systems (like agent-based models) and cultural evolutionism through the concept of abstract rules.