This chapter contributes to a deeper understanding of the hitherto under-explored views of Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), philosopher, jurist, and reformer, on the truth of the ‘religion of Jesus’. It discusses Bentham’s radical arguments against the probative force of natural and supposedly supernatural evidence for the truth-claims of Christianity, and explains why Bentham thought that such claims could no more withstand the scrutiny of reason and empirical enquiry than they could bear the weight of their own contradictions and absurdities. Bentham hoped that the arguments to which his scrutiny of the scriptural evidence had given rise would encourage religious believers to exercise greater scrutiny of their own: first, by allowing the truth-claims of religion to appeal to their scepticism rather than their credulity, and, second, by considering whether such claims were reconcilable with what their sense experience of the physical world showed them to be empirically and epistemologically well-grounded.