The conclusion restates the comparative findings in terms of instrumental power: distributive outcomes during the commodity boom depended on whether agricultural elites converted organization into instituzionalized political resources—legislative seats, partisan linkages, and veto power—rather than relying on costly, episodic de facto mobilzation. Three mechanisms link context to outcomes: (1) the geography of production biased electoral representation; (2) electoral and campaign-finance rules either enabled autonomous, sector-anchored candidacies (open-list) or subordinated them to party gatekeeping (closed-list); and (3) federal coordination and coalition patterns multiplied or narrowed veto points. Where representation was dense and thus unavoidable for forming governing coalitions, as in Brazil, export-rent appropriation failed and regulation was bargained down; where it was thin and adversarial, as in Argentina, executives imposed and defended taxation. Alternative explanations based profitability or exchange rates lack traction without considering these political and instituciona channels; international price/credit cycles set the conditions, but domestic power resources decides the outcomes. The chapter situates these results within debates on federalism, sectoral governance, business power and political-investment portfolios, and delineates scope conditions for applying the framework beyond agriculture.