In this chapter, the paired tracing of negotiation processes between government and rural interests in a few policy episodes in Argentina and Brazil provides qualitative evidence supporting the book’s main argument: the density and partisan alignment of institutionalized rural representation conditioned whether windfall rents were bargained or fought over and ultimately drove the divergent outcomes discussed in chapter 2. On the Argentine side, Resolution 125 and the ensuing confrontation reveal how weak legislative footholds and fragmented associations pushed producers toward extra-institutional pressure, yielding a dramatic but ultimately fragile challenge to export-tax policy. In Brazil, three sequences—CPI da Terra, serial rural-debt renegotiations, and the biosafety/forestry reform cycle—show a different pathway: a disciplined rural caucus leveraged committee control, cross-party linkages, and coalition arithmetic to water down or reshape regulations. The case-analysis of policy episoded provide fine-grained evidence for the proposed mechanisms: dense institutionalized political resources yields incremental bargains and the capacity to protect or advance sectoral interest; thin representation produces episodic contentious political mobilization less effective in shaping policies on an ongoing basis.