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During the Jena period, Hegel neither rejects nor reconciles his divergent elaborations on property from earlier years. A tension, however, can be seen building up between two poles, already distinctly elaborated during Hegel’s youth. One pole is the concept of property as a moment of separation, which is now historical (the bourgeoisie) rather than anthropological (the difficulties of lovers). The other pole, first articulated in the translation of Cart’s book, sees property as a legal device essential for modernity. In the first part of the chapter, I take into consideration two texts: the drafts on the Imperial Constitution and the Essay on Natural Law. The universality of property is first found in the former, namely in a text dating 1798–1799, shortly after the publication of Cart’s translation. However, it is in the Essay on Natural Law that the conceptualisation of property reaches its peak of maximum internal contradiction. On the one hand, property is seen as a universal element; on the other hand, the property-owning social estate is identified exclusively with the bourgeoisie, which Hegel considers the greatest danger to the State and therefore to be kept in a condition of political nullity. In this first systematic attempt, property forms the problematic core of Hegel’s evolving philosophical-political framework. The second part of the chapter focuses on property in the later Jena political texts: the System der Sittlichkeit (1803) and the Systementwürfe III (1805–1806). I argue that these texts reveal two intertwined processes. On the one hand, one finds a progressive top-down structuring of the institutions responsible for governance—the political institutions—which culminates in a fully monarchical form in the 1805–1806 lectures. On the other hand, thanks to the greater strength theorised for political institutions, the second estate can be granted greater freedom. This estate is no longer to be kept in political nullity, as in the Essay on Natural Law; rather, its sentiments must be educated to foster a constructive relationship with political institutions.

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The Progressive Integration of the Bourgeoisie in the Representation of the State in Jena

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  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Matteo Rategni

摘要

During the Jena period, Hegel neither rejects nor reconciles his divergent elaborations on property from earlier years. A tension, however, can be seen building up between two poles, already distinctly elaborated during Hegel’s youth. One pole is the concept of property as a moment of separation, which is now historical (the bourgeoisie) rather than anthropological (the difficulties of lovers). The other pole, first articulated in the translation of Cart’s book, sees property as a legal device essential for modernity. In the first part of the chapter, I take into consideration two texts: the drafts on the Imperial Constitution and the Essay on Natural Law. The universality of property is first found in the former, namely in a text dating 1798–1799, shortly after the publication of Cart’s translation. However, it is in the Essay on Natural Law that the conceptualisation of property reaches its peak of maximum internal contradiction. On the one hand, property is seen as a universal element; on the other hand, the property-owning social estate is identified exclusively with the bourgeoisie, which Hegel considers the greatest danger to the State and therefore to be kept in a condition of political nullity. In this first systematic attempt, property forms the problematic core of Hegel’s evolving philosophical-political framework. The second part of the chapter focuses on property in the later Jena political texts: the System der Sittlichkeit (1803) and the Systementwürfe III (1805–1806). I argue that these texts reveal two intertwined processes. On the one hand, one finds a progressive top-down structuring of the institutions responsible for governance—the political institutions—which culminates in a fully monarchical form in the 1805–1806 lectures. On the other hand, thanks to the greater strength theorised for political institutions, the second estate can be granted greater freedom. This estate is no longer to be kept in political nullity, as in the Essay on Natural Law; rather, its sentiments must be educated to foster a constructive relationship with political institutions.