This second chapter builds upon the conclusions from Chap. 2 and begins by highlighting the conceptual relation between discrimination and structural injustice as well as vulnerability. It then fleshes out the essential yet often implicit role that structural injustice plays in many arguments in the ethics of assisted dying, especially so in those that oppose legalization. Three cases where structural injustice interfaces with assisted dying are then presented. The first two are those of life devaluation and expressive harm, and that of inequality of access to palliative care and choosing when options are limited. Following the same logic as that of Chap. 2 , I then present a third kind of occurrence where structural injustice acts as a barrier to access to assisted dying, departing from the views of most common arguments which usually understand structural injustice as a force to acknowledge which provides reasons to oppose assisted dying. I contend that in many cases, some empirically demonstrated and some more speculative, structural injustices can often limit one’s legitimate access to assisted dying.