The changes in party positions demonstrated in the previous chapter may seem to contradict representation. However, whether or not these changes harm representation largely depends on their underlying reasons. This chapter examines the extent to which parliamentary compromise can explain these position changes. Examining party competition at two stages of representation reveals strong evidence that parties reduce polarisation upon entering parliament and increase it again as electoral competition resumes. This highlights the contrasting logics of the two arenas: distinct party positions are crucial for electoral competition, whereas legislating and governing in parliament necessitate compromise and convergence. These dynamics affect all parties, but they are particularly pronounced for those in government coalitions. The analysis shows that parties in government coalitions significantly narrow their policy gaps, but the degree of adjustment varies according to each party’s bargaining power. Within a coalition bargaining power is quite stable, depending on each party’s size. Therefore, the costs of joining a government coalition are less significant for large parties than for small ones. However, domain-variant characteristics also play a role, as parties are less influenced by their coalition partners on issues salient to them or those where they hold ministerial portfolios.