In this chapter focuses on preference expression, which is the stage at which representation is translated into action. It examines the positions parties are expected to adopt during this phase, explores the factors driving position changes between the electoral and the parliamentary arena, and considers the impact of these changes on voter representation. Building on these discussions, the chapter proposes four sets of hypotheses. The first set contrasts the different demands placed on parties at this stage, exploring how these demands influence party positions. The second set addresses how the distinct logics of party competition in the electoral arena and the parliamentary arena foster position divergence during supply selection and convergence during preference expression. The third set zooms in on coalition compromise, theorising how government coalitions shape the positions of coalition partners in parliament. Finally, the fourth set turns to voters, predicting how position changes in parliament affect parties’ relationships with voters. It contrasts two concepts of representation—the median mandate and the party mandate—and discusses how the need for compromise in parliament and the demand for votes in the electoral arena influence the representation of both the median party voter and the median voter.

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Preference Expression in Parliament

  • Pola Lehmann

摘要

In this chapter focuses on preference expression, which is the stage at which representation is translated into action. It examines the positions parties are expected to adopt during this phase, explores the factors driving position changes between the electoral and the parliamentary arena, and considers the impact of these changes on voter representation. Building on these discussions, the chapter proposes four sets of hypotheses. The first set contrasts the different demands placed on parties at this stage, exploring how these demands influence party positions. The second set addresses how the distinct logics of party competition in the electoral arena and the parliamentary arena foster position divergence during supply selection and convergence during preference expression. The third set zooms in on coalition compromise, theorising how government coalitions shape the positions of coalition partners in parliament. Finally, the fourth set turns to voters, predicting how position changes in parliament affect parties’ relationships with voters. It contrasts two concepts of representation—the median mandate and the party mandate—and discusses how the need for compromise in parliament and the demand for votes in the electoral arena influence the representation of both the median party voter and the median voter.