Leibniz is an ethical eudaimonist. Central to any variety of eudaimonism, of course, is virtue. It is virtuous character—and derivatively, virtuous conduct—that leads to the rational agent’s ultimate goal, happiness. While Leibniz certainly agrees, he can be frustratingly vague whenever virtue is the topic of discussion in the context of moral character and behavior. To be sure, he has much to say on certain particular virtues and their function in the good person’s life, while on virtue itself—its nature, say—his attitude is often casual or perfunctory, apparently taking for granted that anyone knowledgeable enough to be interested in matters moral must already be so acquainted with the concept, and perhaps its traditional usage, that thorough analysis is unnecessary. We are treated to, for the most part, truisms with ancient pedigree: “Virtue is the habit of acting according to wisdom, because practice must accompany knowledge, in order that the exercise of good actions becomes natural for us, and passes into habit…” (Gr 582: LS 169, original emphasis). Fortunately, he does on occasion offer significant clues if not outright analysis of virtue and its fit within his system. Generally speaking, virtue perfects the will so that it is all the more inclined to follow the direction of reason, but most importantly, virtue is an avenue—perhaps even an exclusive avenue—to genuine happiness (if not in this life then surely the next). As we shall see, there is little here that would be disagreeable, let alone terribly controversial, to his predecessors in the tradition of virtue ethics.