Relations with the United States were initially strident and conflict-ridden. They involved the internal character of the regime (legitimacy), relations with neighboring states (equilibrium) and territorial claims and ideological agency (linkage). Tito’s involvement in the Greek civil war and the boundary issue with Trieste implied territorial aggrandizement. Tito also refused a promised non-communist component in the government (Tito-Šubašić Accord). Relations improved after the split between Belgrade and Moscow became public. In June 1948, George Kennan initiated the idea of providing support for the Yugoslav regime in exchange for a “loyal and cooperative attitude in international relationships.” No effort would be made to interfere in the internal regime. Kennan overestimated the idea of polycentric communism. The Cominform’s political assault on Titoism increased the value of the regime for both parties. Economic aid followed with diminished Yugoslav support for the Greek guerrillas. Other conflicts diminished in importance. The military buildup in neighboring states and Yugoslav crop failures in 1950 made assistance more urgent. Despite Tito’s reluctance, military assistance had “appreciably” improved Yugoslav capability by mid-1952. Nevertheless, Western capacity to respond to a crisis was constrained by the unresolved conflict with Italy. The result was the Balkan Pact, an important deterrent after Greece and Turkey joined NATO in 1952.