Theory of Negotiations, Deadlocks, and Stalemates
摘要
This chapter analyzes key theoretical concepts in negotiation theory that help understand the negotiation attempts between the Venezuelan government and the opposition from 2014 to 2024. The analysis includes concepts such as ripeness, impasse, entrapment, polarization, and fragmentation. First, it offers valuable frameworks for analyzing negotiation efforts, including structure, strategy, process, actors, and timing. Additionally, it presents relevant terms for the discussion—from Mutually Hurting Stalemates (MHS) and Way Out (WO) to Mutually Enticing Opportunity (MEO) and Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement (BATNA). It also explores the complexities of deadlocks, stalemates, and intractability and their interactions with specific variables. Lastly, this chapter addresses the challenges of measuring negotiation success and underlines the nuanced nature of negotiations in crisis resolution. The following chapter provides the theoretical basis for the HUSSS framework, which is developed in Chapter 4 and applied to the Venezuelan crisis.