Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder or OCD is a serious mental health condition that is usually held to compromise a person’s free will and free choice, to the point that it has been defined as a malady of free will. In recent times, the notions of egodystonicity and egosyntonicity have entered the philosophical and psychological debate on free will in OCD. Egodystonicity is used in the clinical discourse to indicate when one does not see the symptoms of one’s illness—such as obsessions and compulsions in the case of OCD—as consistent with one’s sense of self. On the contrary, egosyntonicity is used to indicate when one incorporates the symptoms of one’s illness into their sense of self. In the debate on free will in OCD, egodystonicity and egosyntonicity have become highly polarized notions: while the former is supposed to favourably influence mastery over one’s obsessions and compulsions, thus making the person feel more in control of her thoughts and actions, the latter is thought to do the contrary. I argue that egodystonicity and egosyntonicity must be de-polarized, as their being good or bad for control over obsessive-compulsive symptoms depends on which aspects of the sense of self they refer to, such as one’s sense of desirability, morality or rationality. Of these aspects, seeing one’s obsessions and compulsions as consistent with one’s sense of rationality might pose a challenge to mastery over OCD, while it does not seem to be a problem if obsessions and compulsions are seen as in syntony with other valued aspects of the self, such as one’s morality. I illustrate this by presenting the experiences of some people suffering from OCD. Implications are drawn that extend beyond OCD and might be of interest to both philosophers and mental health professionals.