This chapter discusses Federal Communications Commission v. Consumer’s Research. In the case, the Court considered the constitutionality of Congress’ delegation to the FCC of the power to set the rates for telecommunications providers' contribution to ensuring the widespread availability of telecommunications service (i.e., “universal service”). The case raised constitutional questions regarding Congress’ power to delegate legislative authority generally, and the power to tax more specifically. The latter question involved distinguishing users’ fees from taxes. The case also involved the FCC’s power to delegate its authority to a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), raising questions under the “private delegation doctrine.” The Court left its legislative (or "public") and private nondelegation doctrines intact. It rejected Justice Gorsuch’s call to tighten up the legislative nondelegation doctrine, typified by his dissent in Gundy v. U.S., and refused to adopt special limitations on Congress’ delegation of its taxing powers to agencies. The Court upheld the congressional delegation because the relevant statute clearly established the general policy to be pursued as well as the boundaries of the FCC’s delegated authority in a way that provided sufficient standards to ascertain if and when the FCC exceeds its delegated authority (i.e. "an intelligible principle"). The Court upheld the FCC’s delegation of authority to USAC, and explained that the private delegation had no impact on the validity of Congress’ delegation to the FCC.  Federal Communications Commission v. Consumer Research involved a seemingly esoteric question: Does authorizing the Federal Communications Commission (the FCC) to determine the rates telecommunications providers must pay to support projects relating to ensuring universal telecommunications service violate the nondelegation doctrine? But the case brought together several divergent strands of administrative law.

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Federal Communications Commission v. Consumer’s Research: Applying the Nondelegation Doctrine to Agency Discretion over Tax and Fee Obligations

  • Bernard W. Bell

摘要

This chapter discusses Federal Communications Commission v. Consumer’s Research. In the case, the Court considered the constitutionality of Congress’ delegation to the FCC of the power to set the rates for telecommunications providers' contribution to ensuring the widespread availability of telecommunications service (i.e., “universal service”). The case raised constitutional questions regarding Congress’ power to delegate legislative authority generally, and the power to tax more specifically. The latter question involved distinguishing users’ fees from taxes. The case also involved the FCC’s power to delegate its authority to a private entity, the Universal Service Administrative Company (USAC), raising questions under the “private delegation doctrine.” The Court left its legislative (or "public") and private nondelegation doctrines intact. It rejected Justice Gorsuch’s call to tighten up the legislative nondelegation doctrine, typified by his dissent in Gundy v. U.S., and refused to adopt special limitations on Congress’ delegation of its taxing powers to agencies. The Court upheld the congressional delegation because the relevant statute clearly established the general policy to be pursued as well as the boundaries of the FCC’s delegated authority in a way that provided sufficient standards to ascertain if and when the FCC exceeds its delegated authority (i.e. "an intelligible principle"). The Court upheld the FCC’s delegation of authority to USAC, and explained that the private delegation had no impact on the validity of Congress’ delegation to the FCC.  Federal Communications Commission v. Consumer Research involved a seemingly esoteric question: Does authorizing the Federal Communications Commission (the FCC) to determine the rates telecommunications providers must pay to support projects relating to ensuring universal telecommunications service violate the nondelegation doctrine? But the case brought together several divergent strands of administrative law.