Hybrid information campaigns exploit economic grievances and institutional distrust to seed conspiracy narratives that undermine democratic resilience. Using data from the 10th round of the European Social Survey, this chapter examines the individual-level determinants of conspiracy belief in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—states on the front line of Russian “mental-warfare” strategy. Bayesian ordinal regressions, interaction tests, and a mediation model assess how economic satisfaction, perceived income adequacy, political trust, news exposure, and political interest jointly shape conspiratorial thinking. Consistent patterns emerge across the three countries. Moving from high to low satisfaction with the economy increases the odds of strong conspiracy endorsement by roughly two-thirds, but this effect collapses when political trust is high. Trust itself mediates between economic optimism and conspiracy belief, accounting for 40–50% of the pathway. Education provides an additional protective buffer, whereas heavy news use raises risk only in Latvia. Interaction terms suggest mostly additive rather than multiplicative effects, underscoring the primacy of trust. The findings imply that competent, transparent governance, and well-designed macroeconomic stabilizers are the most cost-effective inoculants against malign influence operations in small democracies.

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Conspiracy Beliefs and Cognitive Resilience in the Baltic States

  • Jānis Bērziņš

摘要

Hybrid information campaigns exploit economic grievances and institutional distrust to seed conspiracy narratives that undermine democratic resilience. Using data from the 10th round of the European Social Survey, this chapter examines the individual-level determinants of conspiracy belief in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—states on the front line of Russian “mental-warfare” strategy. Bayesian ordinal regressions, interaction tests, and a mediation model assess how economic satisfaction, perceived income adequacy, political trust, news exposure, and political interest jointly shape conspiratorial thinking. Consistent patterns emerge across the three countries. Moving from high to low satisfaction with the economy increases the odds of strong conspiracy endorsement by roughly two-thirds, but this effect collapses when political trust is high. Trust itself mediates between economic optimism and conspiracy belief, accounting for 40–50% of the pathway. Education provides an additional protective buffer, whereas heavy news use raises risk only in Latvia. Interaction terms suggest mostly additive rather than multiplicative effects, underscoring the primacy of trust. The findings imply that competent, transparent governance, and well-designed macroeconomic stabilizers are the most cost-effective inoculants against malign influence operations in small democracies.