Robert Sparrow argues that while we should recognize vice in mistreatments and cruelty towards robots, like kicking, we shouldn’t recognize virtue. I discuss some problems with this argument. While we’re supposed to investigate whether it is wrong to kick robots, Sparrow’s premise isn’t neutral about such actions, describing them with morally loaded terms like ‘cruel’. I show that such premises with morally loaded terms cannot be taken as given in Human-Robot Interaction (HRI). By focusing on graphic mistreatment scenarios and on what robots resemble or represent, Sparrow and others fail to account for broader, everyday interactions. Where robots come with unique affordance mixtures, don’t necessarily resemble or represent other beings and are directly perceived (rather than fictionalized as Sparrow claims). Thus, robots can be treated in ways different than humans and animals. I emphasize how situation, context, dynamics, interaction and direct affordance perception matter in HRI, where robots play an active role, rather than being passively anthropomorphized or fictionalized. Thus, there is a need for more cognitive scientific insight into HRI ethics. Especially into the indirect robot moral patiency debate, which has been stuck with graphic mistreatment scenarios and stuck with limited descriptive concepts like anthropomorphism and taking robots as representation of other beings.