This chapter examines the complex issues of metropolitan governance and interjurisdictional collaboration, particularly within Latin America. It addresses the “metropolitan problem,” which stems from the artificial fragmentation of a single economic and social unit into multiple jurisdictions, leading to a lack of coordination, inefficiency, and inequity. The chapter also explores traditional solutions to the metropolitan problem, such as the creation of metropolitan governments and its limitations. The chapter proposes that metropolitan governance and interjurisdictional collaboration—the creation of ad hoc, collaborative networks—offer a middle ground to address these challenges. It builds on the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework to analyze these collaborations as a way to mitigate collective action dilemmas. The study identifies three key elements that shape collaboration risks and the choice of integration mechanisms: the nature of the problem, the preferences and capacities of the actors involved, and the existing institutional frameworks. The chapter assesses the ICA framework’s assumptions, highlighting its limitations in contexts characterized by a weak rule of law, the prevalence of informal institutions, and a lack of direct engagement with external stakeholders. Ultimately, the chapter provides an adapted framework for analyzing major Latin American cities, aiming to produce a deeper understanding of urban governance in the region. This framework emphasizes the existence of collaborative risks to address metropolitan issues, which are shaped by political, social, and economic factors.

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Metropolitan Governance, Inequality, and Interjurisdictional Collaboration

  • Edgar E. Ramírez de la Cruz

摘要

This chapter examines the complex issues of metropolitan governance and interjurisdictional collaboration, particularly within Latin America. It addresses the “metropolitan problem,” which stems from the artificial fragmentation of a single economic and social unit into multiple jurisdictions, leading to a lack of coordination, inefficiency, and inequity. The chapter also explores traditional solutions to the metropolitan problem, such as the creation of metropolitan governments and its limitations. The chapter proposes that metropolitan governance and interjurisdictional collaboration—the creation of ad hoc, collaborative networks—offer a middle ground to address these challenges. It builds on the Institutional Collective Action (ICA) framework to analyze these collaborations as a way to mitigate collective action dilemmas. The study identifies three key elements that shape collaboration risks and the choice of integration mechanisms: the nature of the problem, the preferences and capacities of the actors involved, and the existing institutional frameworks. The chapter assesses the ICA framework’s assumptions, highlighting its limitations in contexts characterized by a weak rule of law, the prevalence of informal institutions, and a lack of direct engagement with external stakeholders. Ultimately, the chapter provides an adapted framework for analyzing major Latin American cities, aiming to produce a deeper understanding of urban governance in the region. This framework emphasizes the existence of collaborative risks to address metropolitan issues, which are shaped by political, social, and economic factors.