This chapter examines the emergence of a Swedish ransom diplomacy and negotiation culture in the early modern Mediterranean, culminating in the peace treaty with Algiers in 1729. Throughout the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries, Sweden faced repeated diplomatic failures in securing the release of its enslaved seamen. Early missions—such as those led by Barkman (1669), Cantersteen (1682), and Sparwenfeldt (1694)—highlight the fragmented and ad hoc nature of Swedish efforts. These shortcomings gradually gave rise to a more structured and pragmatic strategy. By the 1720s, the Swedish state had begun to formalise its diplomatic approach to captivity, combining centralised financing with more consistent protocols. The 1729 peace treaty with Algiers represented a turning point: it institutionalised the right to ransom and safe passage, stabilised Sweden’s presence in the region, and laid the groundwork for the expansion of its merchant fleet into the Mediterranean. By analysing archival records, treaty texts, and negotiation reports, the chapter situates Swedish ransom diplomacy within a broader European context of asymmetric power, contested freedoms, and shifting norms of state protection. It highlights how diplomacy itself became a tool for navigating—and reshaping—the legal and moral geographies of unfreedom.