For some decades now, Cora Diamond has argued for fundamentally rethinking the relationship between Wittgenstein’s Tractatus and analytic philosophy. Animating Diamond’s advocacy is the notion that one cannot identify Wittgenstein as a philosopher in the analytic tradition. This concluding chapter demonstrates on both philosophical and historical grounds the erroneousness of this supposition. As we see it, Wittgenstein’s method and his philosophical work throughout the Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations have pivotal consequences for our understanding of the very character and scope of analytic philosophy as a clearly defined school of philosophical thought. Largely overlooked, ignored, or misunderstood, Wittgenstein’s method, in particular, demonstrably marks a more radically formative development of the analytic philosophy pioneered by Frege, Russell and G. E. Moore. And this despite the efforts of the Vienna Circle and the English analytic philosophers shortly before and shortly after the Second World War to emulate and follow up Wittgenstein’s achievement. The decades following Wittgenstein’s death saw the current of analytic philosophy grow increasingly heterogenous and diffuse. Today it is no more than a virtually formless “philosophical tradition”, one practically impossible to define.