This chapter asks what follows if children are not owed best care, but more than adequacy. Is there a standard in between that is morally required but not maximal? In particular, can we make sense of a duty to provide good care, and if so, to whom is this duty owed? These questions matter not only for understanding parental responsibility, but also for clarifying the appropriate role of the state in childrearing. In this chapter, then, I argue that children have a moral right to adequate care. They have this right against their parents, and the correlative parent’s duties are enforceable.

错误:搜索内容不能为空,请输入英文关键词
错误:关键词超出字数限制,请精简
高级检索

Is ‘Good’ Enough?

  • Danielle Levitan

摘要

This chapter asks what follows if children are not owed best care, but more than adequacy. Is there a standard in between that is morally required but not maximal? In particular, can we make sense of a duty to provide good care, and if so, to whom is this duty owed? These questions matter not only for understanding parental responsibility, but also for clarifying the appropriate role of the state in childrearing. In this chapter, then, I argue that children have a moral right to adequate care. They have this right against their parents, and the correlative parent’s duties are enforceable.