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This chapter develops a working analysis of the trait and virtue of epistemic care. It canvasses several accounts of epistemic care that are exclusively other-regarding (Byerly 2021; Kidd 2023; Broncano-Berrocal 2020) and raises two problems for these otherwise insightful accounts. It argues that they (1) neglect epistemic care for oneself—epistemic self-care; and (2) struggle to explain why excessive care for the epistemic goods of others—epistemic subservience—isn’t virtuous. Building on insights from the feminist views proposed by Slote (2001), Dalmiya (2016), and Johnson (2023), the chapter develops an analysis of the trait of epistemic care that features epistemic care for oneself—epistemic self-care—in addition to epistemic care for others, thus addressing the first problem. It argues that the trait of epistemic care (EC) consists in: (1) a motivational disposition to care about promoting epistemic goods for others and for oneself; (2) a behavioral disposition to act in an effort to promote epistemic goods for others and for oneself; (3) a perceptual disposition to notice opportunities to promote epistemic goods for others and for oneself; and (4) an affective disposition to respond positively to the promotion of epistemic goods for others and for oneself and negatively to obstructions to promoting epistemic goods for others and for oneself. The chapter also argues that for one’s trait of epistemic care to be an intellectual virtue, one must: know which things are epistemically good for others and for oneself; strike a balance in one’s proximate motivations, and exercise good judgment in weighing the value of others’ epistemic goods against the value of one’s own; and be driven by an ulterior motivation that is itself epistemically good. Balanced proximate motivations and good judgment are needed to avoid excessive care for the epistemic goods of others—epistemic subservience—thus addressing the second problem above. Ultimately, my hope is that this analysis of epistemic care might be a resource for marginalized educators.

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Epistemic Care, Self-Care, and Subservience

  • 章节

  • 发表日期：

    2026年

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  • Heather Battaly

摘要

This chapter develops a working analysis of the trait and virtue of epistemic care. It canvasses several accounts of epistemic care that are exclusively other-regarding (Byerly 2021; Kidd 2023; Broncano-Berrocal 2020) and raises two problems for these otherwise insightful accounts. It argues that they (1) neglect epistemic care for oneself—epistemic self-care; and (2) struggle to explain why excessive care for the epistemic goods of others—epistemic subservience—isn’t virtuous. Building on insights from the feminist views proposed by Slote (2001), Dalmiya (2016), and Johnson (2023), the chapter develops an analysis of the trait of epistemic care that features epistemic care for oneself—epistemic self-care—in addition to epistemic care for others, thus addressing the first problem. It argues that the trait of epistemic care (EC) consists in: (1) a motivational disposition to care about promoting epistemic goods for others and for oneself; (2) a behavioral disposition to act in an effort to promote epistemic goods for others and for oneself; (3) a perceptual disposition to notice opportunities to promote epistemic goods for others and for oneself; and (4) an affective disposition to respond positively to the promotion of epistemic goods for others and for oneself and negatively to obstructions to promoting epistemic goods for others and for oneself. The chapter also argues that for one’s trait of epistemic care to be an intellectual virtue, one must: know which things are epistemically good for others and for oneself; strike a balance in one’s proximate motivations, and exercise good judgment in weighing the value of others’ epistemic goods against the value of one’s own; and be driven by an ulterior motivation that is itself epistemically good. Balanced proximate motivations and good judgment are needed to avoid excessive care for the epistemic goods of others—epistemic subservience—thus addressing the second problem above. Ultimately, my hope is that this analysis of epistemic care might be a resource for marginalized educators.