Soul
摘要
I espouse not empirical but transcendental behaviorism. It is silly to think that all there is to the world of empirical psychology, or the world at large, is behavior. It is true, rather, that in thinking about the world of empirical psychology, or indeed the world at large, and in talking about it, we should build our logical space of concepts and our vocabulary of words starting with the concept of behavior, and every other concept we use should be either dependent on, or defined in terms of, that of behavior. Within this thinking and talking, there is room for the traditional notion of soul: not as an autonomous entity (let alone an immaterial, immortal one) but as a quality of behaviors and subjects, which are soulful (or, even better, soulfully) insofar as they are playful. In agreement with classical figures of the Italian philosophical tradition like Giordano BrunoBruno, Giordano and Tommaso CampanellaCampanella, Tommaso, I believe that everything in the world is alive and soulful, having a drive to survival (Bruno’s “desio di conservarsi”). And I also agree with Bruno in claiming that there is no survival without self-transcendence, whose archetypes are the Heraclitean fire evoked by Hegel in picturing his concept, and the love that, says Bruno, “converts the loved thing into the lover in the same way as fire, which of all elements is the most active, is powerful in converting all those other simple and composite things into itself.”