It is time to draw some general conclusions from all the work done. First, there is nothing artificial about “artificial intelligence.” It is yet another manifestation of the intelligence which is all around us in nature—and includes things that we take, wrongly, to be inanimate, whereas they are all, as BrunoBruno, Giordano and CampanellaCampanella, Tommaso taught us, no less animate than we are. Second, as was clear from the beginning of this book, play can happen at different levels, and different subjects can profit (or the opposite) from it. As Ivan Illich pointed out, whether machines will be our slaves or we will be theirs is a matter of crossing or not crossing a certain threshold: the one I envisioned thirty-five years ago, and got no traction about. It’s a matter of how fast, powerful, and resourceful the play of a computer “complex” is as compared to what human play looks like; when a critical mass is reached, there will be no turning back. And I believe the critical mass has been reached. “Machines” (if that is what we insist on calling them) are as playful and intelligent as humans; they have as much of a soul, a consciousness, and a will; they use language and think as well as we do. In the sense that is relevant to a philosopher: they can be, and do, all of this. And be it and do it even better than us.