The exploration of the relationship between our epistemic vulnerability and Plato’s second voyage of philosophy, as characterised in the dialogue Phaedo, is the main theme of this chapter. The purpose of establishing this relationship is not simply historical but also systematic. In Plato, our epistemic vulnerability relates to the epistemological status of our best critically argued hypothetical discourses. We should use them as provisional and vulnerable norms to separate the real from the unreal. In my reading of Plato, this does not mean that we know how reality is in-itself (i.e. that our beliefs are true). Rather, it means that, under certain conditions, our theories are progressively more epistemically verisimilar. Various consequences are derived from this stance, including anti-representationalism, doxastic purificationism, the idea of negative knowledge (the fact that we might know, with a higher degree of reliability, what reality is not that we might know what reality actually is), and the denial of direct realism. Based on these remarks, I then critically assess Richard Rorty’s distinction between objectivity and solidarity.