The theoretical and conceptual machinery that I have advanced throughout this book is put to work to provide a different analysis of one of the best-known case studies in the history of science: the Renaissance revolution in astronomy and its antecedents in Greek astronomy. I show that the replacement of Ptolemaic astronomy with the Copernican and Tychonian models and, finally, Kepler’s system, does not support either a realist or an anti-realist account of science. Rather, I stress how each successive theory regarded previous theories as making different errors for different reasons. However, each replacement theory also regarded its forerunners as providing different kinds of epistemic successes. The incommensurability of the three competing theories (Ptolemy’s, Copernicus’s and Tycho Brahe’s) was resolved by Kepler, who offered a theory that does not agree with any of them but is closer to Copernicus’s in several general and basic assumptions, although it is more empirically successful. The result is that Kepler’s model is more epistemically verisimilar than the three previous models.