This chapter explores what constitutes performance of an expert fund manager in actively managed equity funds. Drawing on literature from finance and expertise, and exploratory interviews with actors in different roles in the fund industry, we problematise performance and explore it beyond the simple stock portfolio return. The findings highlight three areas, starting with the fundamental difficulty of assessing and measuring long-term performance of a fund manager in relation to a fund’s excess returns. Hence, approximate ways of assessing and measuring the performance of fund managers were used such as comparison with an index, or a ‘good enough’ rating from a rating agency, combined with a proven investment strategy and process. Second, fund managers’ tasks were not limited to generating excess returns; ability to market the fund and being a good representative and colleague for the fund were also important. This indicates a potential agency issue for the investors with the owners of the fund. Third, the findings suggest a difference in fund managers and organisational types. For example, funds that were owned by larger organisations such as banks or insurance companies could not provide equal or better remuneration or visibility for the individual fund manager compared with privately-owned fund companies, suggesting that privately owned funds have an advantage in recruiting and keeping expert fund managers.

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Performance and Fund Managers’ Expertise

  • Martin Abrahamson,
  • Michael Grant

摘要

This chapter explores what constitutes performance of an expert fund manager in actively managed equity funds. Drawing on literature from finance and expertise, and exploratory interviews with actors in different roles in the fund industry, we problematise performance and explore it beyond the simple stock portfolio return. The findings highlight three areas, starting with the fundamental difficulty of assessing and measuring long-term performance of a fund manager in relation to a fund’s excess returns. Hence, approximate ways of assessing and measuring the performance of fund managers were used such as comparison with an index, or a ‘good enough’ rating from a rating agency, combined with a proven investment strategy and process. Second, fund managers’ tasks were not limited to generating excess returns; ability to market the fund and being a good representative and colleague for the fund were also important. This indicates a potential agency issue for the investors with the owners of the fund. Third, the findings suggest a difference in fund managers and organisational types. For example, funds that were owned by larger organisations such as banks or insurance companies could not provide equal or better remuneration or visibility for the individual fund manager compared with privately-owned fund companies, suggesting that privately owned funds have an advantage in recruiting and keeping expert fund managers.